



Building on Taylor’s seminal article (1993), a
wide set of literature has tried to identify the mon-
etary policy features prevailing in the course of the
past two decades, during which the monetary au-
thorities proved to be rather efficient in reducing
inflation (chart 1). In this literature, the conven-
tional approach consists in estimating a reaction
function for a monetary authority (the Federal Re-
serve, in most cases) in which a nominal bench-
mark interest rate is adjusted in response to infla-
tion (actual or expected) and output deviations
from their equilibrium levels. These reaction func-
tions, usually called Taylor rules, are consistent
with a set of principles proposed in the literature
for the optimal monetary policy rules.
Given the prominent role played by Taylor
rules in the recent debate on monetary policy, this
article presents a summary of the empirical litera-
ture on the subject, briefly focusing on the possible
advantages, as well as on the operational difficul-
ties and limitations associated with the use of this
kind of analysis instrument. In section 2, the Tay-
lor rule is analysed within the scope of the litera-
ture on monetary policy and some empirical re-
sults are presented. The main operational issues
and the limitations associated with the use of the
rule are discussed in section 3. Finally, section 4
concludes, arguing that notwithstanding the iden-
tified limitations, Taylor rules may provide a use-
ful element of analysis in the debate on monetary
policy.




The sharp increase in inflation rates, recorded
in several industrial countries during the 1970s —
the so-called “High Inflation” period — has di-
rectly or indirectly given rise to a large part of the
investigation in the field of monetary economy.
The pioneer works of Kydland and Prescott (1977)
and Barro and Gordon (1983) have shown that, if
the monetary authorities have incentives to ex-
pand output (reduce unemployment) above (be-
low) its equilibrium level, the discretionary policy
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Chart 1
INFLATION RATE IN GERMANY,
UNITED STATES AND JAPAN
1971-1999
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Source: Datastream.will have a bias towards an excessive inflation (the
so-called “inflation bias”)(1). In this sense, these au-
thors argue in favour of a reform of monetary in-
stitutions, as a mean of preventing inflation from
reaching again the values recorded in the 1970s.
These reforms would include, inter alia, the set-
ting-up, by legislative means, of an independent
central bank, responsible for the control of the
monetary policy instruments, and with the explicit
objective of maintaining price stability.
During the past few years, increasing attention
has been paid to the way monetary policy is con-
ducted and, in particular, to the role played by
monetary policy rules. Several reasons seem to be
behind this trend, namely the fact that since the
late 1980s a wide set of literature has pointed to
the significant influence of monetary policy on the
performance of economic activity in the short run.
In most of these works, the temporary price rigid-
ity is the basic friction, which explains the
non-neutrality of monetary policy. The literature
tries to identify simple monetary policy rules, ca-
pable of reducing the probability of emergence of
inflationary shocks similar to those occurred in the
1970s. Among these rules, those trying to model
the way the monetary authority changes the mon-
etary policy instrument (usually, a short term in-
terest rate) have played a prominent role. These
rules are now called “Taylor rules”, after John
Taylor’s paper published in 1993. The original for-
mulation of the Taylor rule was the following:
() ir x TAYLOR tt t =+ + - + ** pg pp j (1)
or, in an equivalent way, with bg q =+ 1e =
() =r * + 1-bp *:
ix TAYLOR tt =+ + qb p j (1a)
whereiTAYLOR is the target interest rate proposed by
the rule, pt the average inflation rate in the past
four quarters (measured by the GDP deflator), p*
the target for the inflation rate, xt the output gap
(defined as the deviation of output from potential
output, as a percentage of potential output) and r*
the equilibrium real interest rate. All variables are
defined in levels. It should be noted that if
bj >> 10 and , the real interest rate is adjusted in
order to stabilise inflation and output; if b< 1, part
of the inflation is accommodated. In this case, the
nominal interest rate change is not sufficient to
give rise to a real interest rate change in the same
direction. The same applies to j, which must be
non-negative in order to obtain a stabilising rule.
This kind of analysis is somewhat contrasting, for
instance, with that of the so-called limited partici-
pation models (see Box).
The main contribution of Taylor’s work was the
distinction between normative and positive ele-
ments. At the normative level, approximate (and
sometimes exact) formulations of the Taylor rule
are optimal for a monetary authority with a qua-
dratic loss function in inflation and output devia-
tions from their respective targets, in a context of
general equilibrium models with price rigidity
[see, for example, Ball (1997)](2). In particular, the
rule stipulates that, in response to an inflation rate
increase, the nominal interest rate is sufficiently
adjusted in order to raise the real interest rate(3).A t
the positive level, Taylor demonstrated that with
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(1) Christiano and Gust (1999) argue that Barro and Gordon’s the-
ories may have lost some of their influence in recent years be-
cause evidence did not confirm them. In the United States, and
in the absence of any institutional reform, from the early 1980s
onwards there was a sustained fall in inflation, three years be-
fore the unemployment rate started to decrease from histori-
cally high levels. Between 1980 and 1983, the US inflation rate
decreased from 13.5 to 3.2 per cent, whereas in the same pe-
riod the unemployment rate increased from 7.2 to 9.7 per cent
— the highest level recorded in the second half of the century.
A similar phenomenon took place in Europe and in other
countries, i.e. inflation seems to have started to abate when in-
centives to its emergence were bigger.
(2) In most models, an optimal monetary policy rule is defined as
one that minimises the weighted sum of output and inflation
variances, the weights being determined by policy-makers’
preferences. An efficient rule is one that, given the weights, be-
comes optimal, or one that places the economy in the boundary
defined by output and inflation variances.
(3) Clarida, Galí and Gertler (1999) build on a monetary authority
objective function targeted at minimising output() x t and infla-
tion (pt) gaps vis-à-vis their equilibrium values, which is sub-
ject to two restrictions: an equation which establishes an inverse
relation between the output gap (x t) and the real interest rate
(IS curve); and another equation which establishes a positive re-
lation between inflation and the output gap (Phillips curve).
The solution for this problem leads to the following optimality
condition:
() x tt =-l ap /
where land a translate the gain in terms of inflation per output
unit (a parameter of the Phillips curve) and the weight of the
output gap on the target function, respectively. Whenever infla-
tion stands above the target () pt >0 , the output gap must nar-
row (the interest rate increases), the reverse occurring when the
inflation rate is lower than the target defined.certain values for the parameters (the values de-
fined by Taylor wereb=1.5, j=0.5, p*=2 andr*=2(4)),
the rule provides a reasonable description of the
US Federal Reserve monetary policy from 1987 to
1992 (the beginning of this period coincides with
the entrance into office of the Federal Reserve
Chairman, Alan Greenspan).
2.2 Taylor rule and monetary policy gradualism
The kind of formulation originally proposed by
Taylor does not consider the gradualist approach,
which seems to characterise the action of monetary
authorities in many situations (the so-called “inter-
est rate smoothing”). This problem may be solved
by means of a partial adjustment of the interest
rate (it) vis-à-vis the target defined by the rule
() iTAYLOR :
() ii i tt TAYLOR =+ - - rr 1 1 (2)
With r defining the degree of monetary policy
gradualism () 01 << r . Combining (1a) and (2) we
obtain:
() () () ix i tt t t =- +- +- +- 11 1 1 rq rb p rj r (3)
The values estimated for the adjustment coeffi-
cient () r range generally between 0.6 and 0.8 for
quarterly data, and are close to 0.9 for monthly
data(5).
In several models, there is an implicit trade-off
between the interest rates volatility, on the one
hand, and inflation/output volatility, on the other.
In other words, there is the possibility of stabilis-
ing output and inflation according to policy rules,
which despite being very aggressive, induce sig-
nificant interest rate fluctuations. To overcome
this problem, the monetary authority loss function
may be increased by including an interest rate sta-
bilisation term:
() () Lx i i tt t t t =- + +- > - pp l n l n > 0
*
2 2
1 0 , com e
Sack and Wieland (1999) argue that the exis-
tence of gradualism in monetary policy is useful
when the economic agents have a forward-looking
behaviour, when there are measurement errors as-
sociated with certain fundamental variables, or
when some relevant structural parameters are not
known. In models with forward-looking expecta-
tions(6), rules of type (2) may be more appropriate
in the stabilisation of inflation and output than
those without partial adjustment. With a suffi-
ciently gradualist policy, agents expect a small ini-
tial interest rate movement to be followed by addi-
tional movements in the same direction, which in-
creases the monetary policy impact on output and
inflation, avoiding large interest rate changes. On
the other hand, models usually assume that pol-
icy-makers consider economic variables without
any type of measurement errors. In practice, eco-
nomic data tend to be revised on several occasions
after their first release. Thus, a rule of type (2) may
moderate the interest rate response to the first re-
lease of data, when these are still subject to revi-
sions. Finally, due to uncertainty regarding the
fundamental parameters of the economic structure
underlying the transmission mechanism, authori-
ties chose to act more cautiously, making gradual
interest rate adjustments.
The literature gives other explanations for the
preference of monetary authorities for the adop-
tion of a gradualist policy, such as the concern in
avoiding adverse reactions from financial markets
to frequent and opposite changes in official inter-
est rates, or for reasons concerning the monetary
authority reputation [see Goodhart (1995)].
2.3 Taylor rules and the forward-looking nature of
monetary policy
Formulations (1) and (2) consider only current
inflation, not taking into account the forward-
looking nature of monetary policy. Taking this
into consideration, Clarida, Galí and Gertler
[CGG, (1998)] examine the US monetary policy
since 1960, on the basis of a forward-looking ver-
sion of the Taylor rule:
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(4) Several studies have subsequently shown that a modified ver-
sion of the original Taylor rule with a higher j coefficient
would have better stabilising properties, while continuing to
give a good description of the recent behaviour of monetary
policy [see for instance Taylor (1999a)].
(5) It is possible to demonstrate that in a model described by
equation (3) the average transmission lag to the interest rate of
a unit variation in the inflation rate equals () rr /1 - . In this
context, a value of 0.8 forr for quarterly data corresponds to a
value of 0.5 in the case of annual data.
(6) As opposed to expectations based only on the extrapolation of
past behaviour.iE x tt t t =+ + + qbp j 1 (1b)
As in the original rule (1), the magnitude of pa-
rameters b and j characterises the monetary pol-
icy stance, and it is still desirable that b>1 and
j>0. This version has the advantage of consider-
ing the Taylor rule as a particular case. Indeed, if
both the current inflation and the output gap are
sufficient to explain future inflation, then the two
formulations are equivalent.
CGG concluded that the Taylor rule, with the
formulation suggested, characterises adequately
the US monetary policy from 1979 to 1996 (the
period in which the Chairmen of the Federal
Reserve were successively Paul Volcker and Alan
Greenspan). During the preceding period
(1960-79), coefficient b is lower than 1 (table 1),
suggesting that monetary policy accommodated
somehow the increases in expected inflation. For
the Volcker-Greenspan period, this value is signifi-
cantly higher than 1. Given that in this period, the
coefficient j is not significantly different from
zero, the output gap influenced the Federal Re-
serve reaction function only as an inflation rate
predictor.
The change in the Federal Reserve monetary
policy stance from 1979 onwards is shown in chart
2. This chart shows that from mid-1979 onwards
there was a shift in the interest rate behaviour. Un-
til 1979, the ex post real interest rate was negative
or nil on several occasions. As from 1979, the real
interest rate became positive.
Identical results are obtained in Taylor’s work
(1999b). Several episodes of the US monetary pol-
icy history are analysed in this paper, leading to
the conclusion that the type of rule which charac-
terises the Federal Reserve policy in the so-called
“Greenspan era” is quite different from the one of
the preceding periods. This shift is associated with
an equally significant reduction of both output
and inflation volatility in the United States. Table 2
presents a numeric example of the magnitude of
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Table 1
ESTIMATED VALUES FOR THE FED
REACTION FUNCTION
GMM estimation; standard deviations
in parenthesis
bjr
Pre-Volcker ......... 0.8 0.44 0.75
1960:1 – 1979:2....... (0.09) (0.04) (0.04)
Volcker-Greenspan. . . 1.8 0.12 0.66
1979:3 – 1996:4....... (0.19) (0.13) (0.04)
Source: Clarida, Galí e Gertler (1998).
Chart 2
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Table 2
MONETARY POLICY RULES FOR
THE FEDERAL RESERVE
Estimation by the ordinary least quare
method; t statistics in parenthesis
Constant bj
1960:1 – 1979:4 ...... 2.05 0.81 0.25
(6.34) (12.9) (4.93)
1987:1 – 1997:3 ...... 1.17 1.53 0.77
(2.35) (9.71) (8.22)
1954:1 – 1997:3 ...... 1.72 1.10 0.33
(5.15) (15.1) (3.16)
Source: Taylor (1999b).
Source: Datastream.this reversal in the performance of monetary pol-
icy.
It is interesting to verify that two other central
banks, the Bundesbank and the Bank of Japan
(chart 3), have behaved similarly after 1979. CGG
(1997) estimate the rule with the same specifica-
tion and obtain results, which are similar to those
for the Federal Reserve in the Volcker-Greenspan
period (table 3). This behaviour was mirrored in a
worldwide disinflation process as from the 1980s.
2.4 Information problems in the real time application
of Taylor rule
Orphanides (1999) analyses a type of limitation
associated with the utilisation of Taylor rules to
characterise from an historical point of view the
monetary policy stance. Orphanides argues that
the validity of the conclusions obtained in the
works mentioned in the last section is seriously
threatened, as these are based on unrealistic as-
sumptions regarding the set of data available to
the monetary authorities at the decision-making
moment. In particular, rules admit that authorities
have reliable information on the contemporary
values of inflation and output gap when they de-
cide on level of interest rates. However, in particu-
lar the output gap(7) is measured with a consider-
able margin of error, being frequently subject to
significant revisions.
The problem may be analytically described as
follows. Beinget the measurement error of the true
inflation rate () p
a and ft the measurement error of








Substituting (4) and (5) in (1), Taylor rule is ob-
tained according to inflation and output gap true
values and to the measurement errors:






tt =+ + - + - + +
** pg pp j g j 1 (1c)
Equation (1c) reveals the true nature of the
problem. The setting of the interest rate level on
the basis of the inflation rate or the output gap
may, under certain circumstances, lead to undesir-
able effects, because authorities do not know the
true values of these two variables. Therefore, an
historical analysis of the monetary policy stance
should be conducted on the basis of the informa-
tion available at the decision-making moment.
Orphanides examines the US economic perfor-
mance from 1965 to 1993 in the light of a Taylor
rule, but with real time data. The final series and
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Source: Datastream.
Table 3
ESTIMATED VALUES FOR THE
BUNDESBANK (1979:3-1993:12) AND FOR THE





Deutsche Bundesbank . . . 1.31 0.25 0.91
(0.09) (0.04) (0.01)
Bank of Japan........... 2.04 0.08 0.93
(0.19) (0.03) (0.01)
Source: CGG (1997).
(7) The measurement of the output poses, in general, two types of
problems: one concerns the measurement of output itself and
the other involves the potential output calculation method.the real time series for the inflation rate show dif-
ferences that in the first half of the 1970s are fre-
quently higher than one percentage point. Never-
theless, when compared with the output gap dif-
ferences, the measurement error for the inflation
rate may be considered low. Indeed, the real time
output gap series is systematically below the final
series in all the sampling period. This holds partic-
ularly true during the 1970s, when the difference
between the two series reached around ten per-
centage points. The most interesting conclusion of
Orphanides work is perhaps that the original for-
mulation of the Taylor rule describes quite well
the Federal Reserve behaviour, not only in the past
years but also during the 1970s — the so-called
“High Inflation” period — when real time infor-
mation is used. Therefore, the 1970s inflation ac-
celeration may have been the result of an exces-
sively lax monetary policy, which by contrast with
the conclusions of Taylor works, followed closely
a Taylor rule based on very unreliable data.
3. TAYLOR’S RULES: OPERATIONAL ASPECTS
From an operational point of view, the Taylor
rule envolves some aspects, which should be taken
into account. One of them concerns the choice of
the values to be used for parametersb and j. Table
4 shows the values suggested by different models
for the US economy. It is evident that, although
the prameters are not qualitatively very different,
the results drawn from each model can be rather
different in terms of magnitude. On the other
hand, as derived from equation (1), the Taylor rule
recommends an objective for the nominal interest
rate, which depends on three variables (real equi-
librium interest rate, target value for the inflation
rate and the output gap) which are derived from a
set of assumptions. The usefulness of Taylor rules
for information purposes depends therefore on
their robustness to small variations in the hypothe-
ses assumed for these variables.
3.1 Real equilibrium interest rate
One of these elements is the real equilibrium in-
terest rate or “real neutral interest rate”, i.e. the in-
terest rate which is consistent with a scenario
where the inflation equals the target value defined
by monetary authorities, and the output matches
potential output. The interest rate recommended
by the rule is rather sensitive to real equilibrium
interest rate estimates: in the absence of monetary
policy gradualism, real equilibrium interest rate
changes have a one-for-one effect on the interest
rate proposed by the rule. As it is not directly ob-
served, the real equilibrium interest rate must be
estimated. In accordance with the “golden rule”
for the accumulation of capital, the marginal
product of capital (which, in equilibrium is equal
to the real interest rate) must be higher than the
output growth rate (a condition for dynamic effi-
ciency). For example, in the case of the euro area,
current estimates of the potential output suggest
that the real long-term equilibrium interest rate
must have a floor close to 2-2.5 per cent. In Tay-
lor’s original paper, the real equilibrium interest
rate admitted for the United States is constant and
equal to 2.0 per cent, whereas according to the
CGG model (1997), the figures admitted are 3.5,
3.8 and 3.3 per cent for the United States, Germany
and Japan respectively. Usually, the estimates re-
sult from the difference between two averages, i.e.
from a nominal interest rate controllable by the
monetary authority and the inflation rate, with
both averages being calculated for a relatively
wide sample. Evidence shows that the results can
vary significantly according to the sample period;
in certain cases this period can cover different
monetary policy regimes.
In the case of the euro area the real equilibrium
interest rate may have declined with the advent of
the monetary union. Gerlach and Schnabel (1999)
suggest that the reduction of the real equilibrium
interest rate was greater in the countries whose
currencies depreciated against the Deutsche mark
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Table 4
VALUES FOR PARAMENTERSbAND jIN





Taylor (1993) ................ 1.50 0.50
Taylor (1999a) ............... 1.50 1.00
Ball (1997) .................. 1.50 1.00
Christiano (1999) ............ 3.00 0.50
Clarida, Galí e Gertler (1998) . . 1.80 0.12
Rotemberg e Woodford (1998). 1.20 0.06over recent years. However, the figure presented
by these authors for the real equilibrium interest
rate in the euro area (3.5 per cent) seems excessive,
given that it covers a rather long period (1982-97)
and weighs large and small countries similarly(8).
Based on the evidence compiled, the current level
of the real equilibrium interest rate seems to stand
at around 3.0 per cent — a figure close to the esti-
mates obtained with a reaction function for the
Bundesbank for the past two decades and to the
average of the G7 real interest rates in the past five
years.
It should be noted that the level of the real
equilibrium interest rate is endogenous to the
credibility of the monetary authority. For example,
the more credible the European Central Bank
(ECB) is in the pursuance of the objective of price
stability, the lower the risk premium associated
with inflation rate variability and the lower the
real equilibrium interest rate.
3.2 Target value for the inflation rate
The most common Taylor rules incorporate an
inflation target to be achieved in the medium term,
which is constant over the whole sample period.
However, the inflation targets have rarely been
maintained over the time horizon of the analysis:
the current inflation target is not necessarily the
same as it was 10 or 20 years ago, depending, for
instance, on the preferences of the monetary au-
thorities over time, as well as on the monetary pol-
icy regime pursued. For example, the primary ob-
jective of the Eurosystem’s monetary policy strat-
egy is to maintain price stability, which is defined
as an increase in the Harmonised Index of Con-
sumer Prices (HICP) for the euro area of below 2
per cent per annum. In addition, it should be
noted that the original Taylor rule uses as inflation
measure the percentage change in the GDP defla-
tor between year-on-year quarters, whereas CGG
(1997) use the Consumer Price Index (CPI). Thus,
an analysis should be made of the robustness of
the recommendations made by the rule as regards
alternative inflation measures. Kozicki (1999) anal-
yses the robustness of the Taylor rule by means of
four alternative inflation measures — CPI, trend
CPI, GDP deflator and expected inflation — con-
cluding that the recommendations suggested by
the rule are modestly robust across the various
measures.
3.3 Output gap
The inclusion of the output gap in the rule poses
several problems. Given that it is not an observable
variable, the output gap must be estimated, with
significant disparities being frequently observed
across different estimates, depending on the estima-
tion method that is used. For example, the European
Commission forecasts disclosed last April showed
estimates for the euro area output gap in 2000 of -0.2
per cent when the HP filter is used and -1.2 per cent
when the production function approad is applied.
On the other hand, it should also be noted that the
concept of potential output itself, and hence of the
output gap, is not consensual, for there are different
notions in the literature.
For the purpose of formulating the monetary
policy, the knowledge of the output gap estimates
for the more close periods is particularly important.
However, estimates for the contemporaneous out-
put gap are uncertain, either because recent output
figures are still preliminary or because most estima-
tion techniques, namely univariate methods such as
the HP filter, pose some problems at the end of the
sample. Smets (1998) concludes that, within the
scope of the Taylor rules, uncertainty in the output
gap measurement reduces the responsiveness of the
output gap estimate (coefficient j) in comparison
with that of the inflation rate deviation. In a way,
this can explain the reason why the estimate for the
coefficient associated with the output gap in the
Taylor rule is normally lower than what is consid-
ered optimal in literature in general.
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(8) The calculation of the real equilibrium interest rate for the euro
area on the basis of the average of the real interest rates prevail-
ing, for example, during the past two decades, is likely to show
an upward bias. In fact, over this period, one could notice a dis-
inflation process in the euro area, which may have caused real
interest rates to stand above their equilibrium level. Against
this background, it seems more appropriate to use the previous
interest rates recorded in Germany - a country characterised by
a high level of macroeconomic stability in recent years.4. CONCLUSIONS
Evidence shows that Taylor rules reasonably
describe the behaviour of the main monetary au-
thorities, namely the US Federal Reserve and the
Bundesbank, in the past two decades — a period
in which the monetary policy performance is gen-
erally considered as having been rather successful
in reducing inflation. In this respect, it seems rea-
sonable to argue that, even under different eco-
nomic circumstances, such as those currently pre-
vailing in the euro area, the Taylor rule can be a
useful reference to the debate on monetary policy.
The operational aspects and the limitations pre-
sented in this article must be considered in the
analysis of the indications suggested by the Taylor
rule. The latter should not be followed mechani-
cally, but as an additional element to be taken into
account. In this context it should be noted that, in
addition to the limitations of a conceptual and
methodological nature associated with the utilisa-
tion of the rule, there are situations in which mon-
etary policy decisions are influenced by events not
directly related to inflation or the output gap. A
good example of this were the three successive
cuts in the target for the Federal funds rate under-
took in the second quarter of 1998, in the after-
math of the international financial crisis. The fol-
lowing extract from the minutes of the Federal
Open Market Committee meeting held on 29 Sep-
tember 1998 is quite clear in this respect:
“(…) all the members endorsed a proposal calling
for a slight easing in reserve markets to produce a de-
cline of ¼ percentage point in the federal funds rate to
an average of about 5¼ per cent.(…) such action was
desirable to cushion the likely adverse consequences of
the global financial turmoil that had weakened foreign
economies and of the tighter conditions in financial
markets in the United States that had resulted in part
from that turmoil. (…)”
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Box – TAYLOR RULES WITHIN THE SCOPE OF LIMITED PARTICIPATION MODELS
Most of the works published in this field assess monetary policy rules within the framework of IS-LM mod-
els, with rational expectations and rigid prices. As an alternative to the conventional approach, Christiano and
Gust (1999) study Taylor rules performance within the scope of the so-called limited participation models [see
Christiano (1999)]. The limited participation models are different from those usually utilised in two key as-
pects. On the one hand, it is a credit market friction that implies the non-neutrality of monetary policy. On
the other hand, the transmission of inflation expectations to output is different from the one admitted in tradi-
tional models. A self-sustained rise in inflation expectations has a depressive effect on the economic activity,
while it has an expansionary effect on conventional models.
Following the IS/LM tradition, in conventional models an increase in expected inflation reduces the real in-
terest rate, stimulating the components of aggregate demand which are sensitive to the interest rate. Con-
sidering that both the expected inflation and the output gap increase, a restrictive monetary policy is appropri-
ate, preventing inflation expectations from becoming self-sustained. Therefore, sufficiently high jand b avoid
the emergence of equilibria in which inflation expectations are self-sustaining. On the contrary, in the limited
participation models a higher expected inflation leads to a replacement of financial assets with physical assets,
giving rise to cash shortage in the financial sector and an upward pressure on interest rates. With a small b,
the monetary authority supplies sufficient liquidity to moderate interest rate increases, leading to the inflation
rise anticipated by agents. Thus, in line with the conventional literature, a highb reduces the probability of in-
flation expectations being self-sustaining. On the other hand, it has to be taken into consideration that interest
rate increases, due to expectations of a higher inflation, have a recessive effect on the economy. Therefore, with
a sufficiently high j coefficient, the narrowing of the output gap may offset the direct effect of inflation in-
creases on the interest rate, the inflation expectations becoming self-sustained. Christiano and Gust thus claim
that the possibility of existing equilibria with self-sustained inflation expectations is eliminated when the in-
terest rate reacts aggressively to inflation and does not (or virtually does not) react to the output gap.